When selling their products domestically or internationally …rms rely on more than just price as a strategic variable. Any trade policy that a¤ects or limits the use of one of these variables will likely have strategic consequences for the use of all the others. Using a Hotelling model with vertical di¤erentiation we focus on how trade policy barriers alter price and non-price competition on the goods market. The main results are as follows: …rst, no matter whether the trade restriction (tari¤) is placed on the non-price instrument or on the good itself, the foreign (home) …rm prefers to increase (decrease) its use of its pricing tool and give up some of (increase) its use of the non-price instrument. Second, in the presence of a non-price instrument, tari¤s do not always lead both …rms to increase their price: it can lead the foreign …rm to decrease its (…nal) price.
Introduction
Worldwide, consumers base their purchasing decisions both on price and non-price characteristics such as advertising, R&D, quality, just to name a few. Accordingly, when selling their products domestically or internationally, …rms rely on more than just price as a strategic variable and compete for market share using an ample set of non-price instruments.
In this richer strategic setting, many interesting questions naturally arise; How does the introduction of a tari¤ on the goods market a¤ect the strategic behavior of domestic and foreign …rms? Will both …rms switch to using a non-price instrument (NPI) more aggressively? Equally, does a trade restriction on the use of a NPI mean that the foreign …rm will be more or less aggressive on pricing? We expect that any trade policy that a¤ects or limits the use of one of these strategic variables will likely have consequences for the use of all the others.
Our main objective is to study how trade restrictions on di¤erent markets (the goods market and the markets for non-price instruments) in ‡uence the optimal strategy mix of the protected and the foreign …rm. Firms invest in the NPI because it changes the product's image, brand, technological speci…cations, design, or anything else that will change its perceived 'quality'in the eye of the consumer. We model this by introducing vertical di¤erentiation in the Hotelling model (Economides (1989) ) in which a domestic and a foreign …rm compete not only through their pricing strategy but also through their NPI.
We …rst introduce a tari¤ on the goods market, a domestic intervention that a¤ects the pricing tool, and show that this, interestingly, reduces the foreign …rm's use of the NPI and has it price more aggressively than the home …rm. The intuition behind this result is that a tari¤ leads to a lower margin for the foreign …rm which subsequently reduces the marginal bene…t of using the NPI and, other things equal, induces it to use her pricing tool more intensively. Moreover, for some parameter values, this e¤ect is strong in the sense that the foreign …rm's …nal price (including the tari¤) is lower than its price before the introduction of the tari¤. That is, tari¤s can reduce the …nal price of the foreign good. As far as we now, this result is new in the trade literature where tari¤s are known to increase prices and illustrates the main message of the paper: when …rms compete through more than one instrument one has to take into account how a restriction on one instrument in ‡uences the optimal strategic use of all of them.
We subsequently introduce trade policy regarding non-price instruments. Domestic governments can increase the cost the foreign …rm incurs when using its NPI. This can happen through the imposition of a tari¤ on imports of this 'sales input'. Equally, domestic governments can decrease the cost the home …rm incurs when using its NPI. This can happen through subsidizing the domestic …rm when it uses its NPI. The latter possibility is exempli…ed by R&D subsidies while the former by restrictions on the use of foreign advertising. In order to illustrate the results we will use the 'advertising'interpretation keeping in mind, however, that advertising is just a proxy for all possible NPIs.
A trade restriction on the NPI puts the foreign …rm at a cost disadvantage with respect to the use of the NPI. We show that the e¤ect on the pricing game is that it, not so surprisingly, leads the foreign …rm to price more aggressively and invest less in the NPI. This result provides an alternative explanation for price-based dumping. The latter is most commonly attributed to di¤erences in transportation costs (Brander and Krugman, 1983 ), but here dumping arises from di¤erential costs of using one of many strategic variables. More importantly, though, note that no matter whether the disadvantage is in pricing or in the NPI, the foreign …rm will be tempted to use its pricing tool more intensively and its NPI less intensively.
Our paper draws from both the industrial organization literature on horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation and the trade policy literature in the presence of an oligopoly. We draw from Matsumura and Matsushima (2009) when introducing tari¤s which transforms the classic Hotelling model in one with asymmetric marginal costs. In the trade literature, the closest to our paper and, as far as we know, the only paper discussing the e¤ect of trade and industrial policy on advertising and pricing is Ma and Ulph (2009). They study advertising in the context of di¤erentiated duopoly and strategic, export oriented, industrial and trade policy. Ma and Ulph (2009) aim to study the robustness of industrial policy versus export subsidies/taxes in the tradition of Bagwell and Staiger (1994) , Maggi (1996) and Leahy and Neary (2001) . Our paper di¤ers from theirs in at least two dimensions. First, they focus on the robustness of strategic trade policy à la Brander-Spencer (1985) on the goods market from the point of view of the exporting country, while we focus on tari¤ policies from the point of view of importing country. Second, our main objective is to study how trade restrictions on di¤erent markets (goods and/or services) in ‡uence the strategy mix of both the protected and the foreign …rm. Although the issue of robustness is a very important one, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the baseline model after which we introduce a tari¤ on the goods market. Section 3 then adds trade restrictions on foreign advertising. Section 4 concludes.
The Model

Modelling Price and Non-Price Competition
We consider an international duopoly with a home and foreign …rm (denoted by an asterisk) where, prior to engaging in price competition, …rms have the opportunity to invest in a NPI to attract consumers. The game lasts for two stages. In the …rst stage, the two …rms simultaneously choose their investment in the NPI and in the second stage they compete in prices. For simplicity 2 , marginal production costs are assumed to be constant and equal to zero for both …rms and there are no …xed costs.
The level of the NPI is denoted by I and I . Let C(I) and C (I) be the associated costs of investing in the NPI, assumed to be monotonically increasing and convex.
More speci…cally, we assume a quadratic functional form 3 given by:
where parameter a > 0 is a measure of how costly it is to use the NPI. When a decreases, competition in the NPI increases because it becomes cheaper to invest in the NPI.
There is a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed on a line of unit length, with population size normalized to one. The two …rms are located at the extreme ends of this line, say the home …rm at point zero, and the foreign …rm at point one.
Each consumer is characterized by a location x 2 [0; 1], measuring its relative taste for the two products. There is a disutility, interpreted as a transportation cost, of
x when purchasing the domestic product and of 1 x when purchasing from the foreign …rm. Consumers hence face a discrete choice of either buying the home or the imported product. The reservation price of the consumers is , assumed to be large enough so that the market is always covered. The utility of the consumer located at x buying the home or the foreign good is, respectively, given by:
If neither …rm uses the NPI (I = I = 0), consumers will purchase from the …rm with the best price-location combination, where p and p represent the domestic and foreign price of the product respectively.
Let us now de…ne the consumer located at x who is indi¤erent between buying the domestic or the imported product. By de…nition, the utility procured by this consumer is the same for either good, that is:
By solving for x, we can derive the demand functions, by posing q = x and q = 1 x, therefore:
Since we assumed that the market is fully covered the total demand (output) is equal to one and hence quantities can be interpreted as market shares. Note that if the …rms choose the same amount of NPI, then consumers will choose strictly on the basis of price and location. It is only when a …rm uses its NPI more than its rival that it succeeds to increase its demand, ceteris paribus. It is more convenient to express quantities in terms net levels of the NPI: = I I and = I I:
Introducing a Tari¤
In the second stage 4 , when the home government imposes a tari¤, the foreign …rm has to pay a unit duty t > 0 on each unit it sells. Consequently, the optimization problem of the home and foreign …rm is given, respectively, by 4 We will solve the model by backward induction.
From the …rst-order conditions (FOCs), given by
we obtain the second-stage price equilibrium under a tari¤ regime t > 0: Equilibrium prices and quantities are:
By plugging the home and foreign equilibrium prices and quantities into the pro…t functions, respectively, the optimal second stage payo¤s, and ; become equal to:
The results obtained here are fairly standard. Given the NPI levels, a tari¤ leads to an increase of the domestic price p and an even greater increase of the import price p . Hence a tari¤ t > 0 will decrease sales for the foreign …rm, q ; and therefore increase domestic output, q. But the …rms will have the opportunity, in stage 1, to adjust their NPI levels. This allows us to study whether the NPI provides new insights to these standard results.
Focusing on the …rst-stage of the game the …rms will maximize their payo¤s with respect to NPI levels. The maximization problems for the home and foreign …rm are given by
If the second stage equilibrium is interiorn then the FOCs in the …rst stage game are:
Note, in the case of an interior equilibrium in the second stage, the second order conditions of both …rms are satis…ed when a > . Moreover, for any a such that
the equilibrium is locally unstable 5 . We focus our attention on locally (and globally) stable equilibria; a > : In this case the subgame perfect equilibrium NPI levels with a tari¤ (t) in the goods market are given by:
where t = 9a 2 3a
is the prohibitive tari¤ above which the foreign …rm does not trade in the goods market. In terms of net NPI:
if t > t:
Finally, plugging and into the second stage equilibrium prices (3) and quantities (4), we obtain:
5 For a proof see Appendix A.
and:
We refer the reader to the appendix for proofs of all our results.
We thus obtain that a tari¤ 6 leads to a decrease of the advertising level of the foreign …rm and an increase of that of the domestic. In order to understand this, let us ignore for the moment the possibility of using the NPI. Then a tari¤ will lead to a lower margin and a lower demand for the foreign …rm. Given this, and now allowing the …rms to use its NPI we see that the marginal bene…t of one unit of NPI for the foreign …rm is lower than that of the domestic …rm:
That is, other things equal, the domestic …rm has a stronger incentive to use its NPI.
Alternatively, the e¤ect of t on NPI levels can be addressed by totally di¤erentiating the …rst order conditions of the …rms and solving to yield:
6 Note that when t = 0 (free trade in the goods market) the equilibrium is given by:
The prices are equal to the Hotelling model without a NPI. In terms of equilibrium pro…ts, the …rms are worse o¤ compared to the Hotelling model without a NPI: = = 1 2 1 18a which is lower than the equilibrium without vertical di¤erentiation given by = = 1 2 . Firms would prefer to cooperate in order to reduce the amount of NPI they use, but in a one shot game they cannot trust one another and are 'forced'to use the NPI 'excessively'in equilibrium. A tari¤, imposed on the goods market, will result in a lower level of the NPI for the foreign …rm and a higher level for the home …rm, compared to free trade. This is because a tari¤ decreases (increases) the marginal bene…t of using the NPI to the foreign (home) …rm. We now turn our attention to the strategy mix between pricing and the NPI. Since using the NPI becomes less attractive in the foreign …rm strategy mix, the …rm prefers to use its pricing tool more intensively in order to keep its market share. Indeed, without a tari¤, when the cost of using the NPI for both …rms is relatively low (a low a), then they are using this tool rather intensively.
When this is the case, a tari¤ will have a greater impact on price competition. In particular, note that for low levels of a, 2 9 < a < 1 3 , the initial price increase of a tari¤ will be completely washed away by the strategy mix switch from its non-price instrument to its price instrument 7 . Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this result: 7 We can appreciate this by studying the limits of the foreign's equilibrium NPI level and price when a ! + dp dt = 2 3a 1 9a 2 = 1: 
:
These results provide an new insight in the trade literature with price competition, where speci…c tari¤s are known to increase prices. This intuition behind it resides in the fact that in some markets …rms compete intensively with other instruments than the price. In fact, the conventional result that tari¤s increase (…nal) prices is re ‡ected by the second-stage pricing equilibrium p and p . That is, for a given amount of NPI, the imposition of a tari¤ increases prices. Furthermore, the increase in price of the imported product is greater than that of the home product.
The results change however, when …rms are allowed to adjust their NPI in stage one. Once the NPI earns a lower bene…t (because of the tari¤) it becomes more advantageous for the foreign …rm to use its pricing tool more intensively in order to regain a part of its market share, lost due to the tari¤. In other words, it is cheaper for the foreign …rm to lower its price than to use more its NPI to increase its pro…ts. The more …rms are competing through their NPI (low range of a), the more pronounced this e¤ect.
We summarize 8 this key result in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For relatively high costs of using the NPI, a > , the imposition of a speci…c tari¤ leads both …rms to increase prices. However, for lower levels of a in 8 In the appendix we provide a detailed exposition of how the equilbrium is derived. < a < 1 3 , the e¤ect of the price increase for the foreign …rm is completely washed away by the switch it makes in its strategy mix from its NPI to pricing. The foreign …rm will …nd it optimal to become more aggressive on pricing.
3 Pricing, advertising and trade policy
Advertising as an Non-Price Instrument
Domestic governments can increase the cost of the foreign …rm to use its NPI by imposing a tari¤ on imports of this 'sales input'and/or subsidize the use of the NPI for the domestic …rm. The latter possibility is exempli…ed by R&D subsidies while the former by restrictions on the use of foreign advertising. In order to highlight our results we will use the 'advertising' interpretation keeping in mind, however, that advertising restrictions is just a proxy for a trade restriction on all possible NPI's.
We …rst illustrate that foreign …rms do face barriers to advertising in practice.
First observe that there are good reasons why a foreign …rm might wish to produce/purchase advertising in her own market, even if it is targeted to its export market. Firms usually have long-standing relationships with advertising companies in there own market which involve important set up costs. When this is the case, …rms may prefer to continue to deal with 'their'publicity provider than to set up a new relationship with a 'domestic'advertiser. In addition, cultural and product information barriers may increase the cost of 'purchasing'advertising in the country to which they export. On the other hand, the domestic 'advertisers'will probably have better information about the local demand. If the latter e¤ect dominates, the foreign …rm will prefer to purchase advertising in its export market, but will face a higher cost than the local …rm due a lack of information about local market conditions. In the event the other e¤ects dominate, the foreign …rm will prefer to use its 'own foreign'advertising company. Nonetheless, it is also possible to face higher costs due to the existence of barriers on the use of 'foreign'advertising, arising from restrictions on market access and national treatment (Daniels 1995) . Indeed, many countries still greatly favor local advertisers over foreign advertising companies. The following two examples illustrate this (see USCIB, 2002).
In Brazil, an executive decree was signed in 2002 that would require the payment of US$ 28,000 importation fee for each foreign 30-second television commercial.
In Australia, imported commercials can not be used, except when a full Australian crew took part in production and no more than 20% of commercial footage may be of foreign places, persons, events, sounds, voices not available in Australia, but production must be an Australian company.
Either way, the costs of advertising will likely be higher for a foreign exporting …rm than its local domestic rival for two reasons: cultural and informational barriers and/or trade restrictions on foreign advertising.
Solving the model with (trade) barriers to advertising
We now introduce these barriers on advertising in the model. To do so we assume that the foreign …rm has to pay an additional constant cost ( > 0) per unit of advertising.
When the foreign …rm uses local advertising then this cost di¤erence stems mainly from information problems. When the foreign …rm 'imports'advertising in its export market then we let this represent the trade barrier on advertising, which is thus a policy variable for the 'domestic'government.
The cost of using a given level of NPI (advertising), I ; for the foreign …rm is then given by
Hence can be interpreted as a tari¤ or non-tari¤ barriers on advertising 9 .
The optimization program in the …rst stage for the case of advertising is given by equation (5) . The FOCs are consequently
9 If we were to model domestic subsidies to R&D at a rate of > 0 per unit, the cost of using a given level of NPI (R&D outlay I) would then be
C(I) I:
We could then just replicate the analysis performed below, whithout qualitatively changing the obtained results.
For the same reasons as above we focus on the case where a > 2 9
: The Nash equilibrium advertising levels with a tari¤ (t) in the goods market and barriers in the advertising market ( ) are given by :
if t > t;
(12)
where t( ) = t 1 ; t = 9a 2 3a and = 1 3 9a 2 9a 1 :
The amount is the prohibitive level of , given free trade in the goods market (t = 0), above which the foreign …rm does not …nd it pro…table to advertise. The amount t is the prohibitive tari¤ above which the foreign …rm does not trade in the goods market. In terms of net advertising:
if t( ) 6 t < t;
1 + if t > t;
if 0 6 t < t( );
if 0 6 t < t( ); , a tari¤ has the e¤ect of making the foreign …rm switch from its advertising to pricing tool more aggressively. For the case of 0 < t < t( ), inspection of the top equation of (15) reveals that for
an increase in leads the foreign …rm to use prices even more aggressively. The result is easy to understand, since the marginal cost of advertising is lower for the home …rm than for the foreign …rm when > 0. This will lead the home …rm to advertise more and therefore drive the foreign …rm to switch more toward its pricing strategy. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate this.
The above discussion leads to the following general proposition.
Proposition 2. For any 6 , the imposition of a speci…c tari¤ by the government leads to two results: either the government commits to a low level of tari¤, t < t( ) : in which case trade in advertising is not prohibited, or it imposes t, t( ) 6 t 6 t in which case it will prohibit the trade in advertising for the foreign …rm.
1. For t < t( ) and low levels of a, 2 9 < a < 1 3 , the e¤ect of the price increase for the foreign …rm is washed away by the switch it makes in its strategy mix from advertising to pricing, becoming more aggressive on pricing.
2. For t( ) 6 t, the e¤ect of a tari¤ is to increase prices. This is because the foreign …rm can no longer switch from one strategic tool to another and consequently increases its price.
An important link between the market for goods and the market for advertising
The Nash equilibrium also allows us to shed some light on the link between the two markets. It can help us understand the amount of autonomy a government can have in using a tari¤ in the goods market when the services market is relatively protected (a high ) and vice versa. It follows from t( ) = t 1 that for a given level of protection in the advertising market ( < ), we obtain the range within which a government can choose its speci…c tari¤ without forcing the foreign …rm not to use foreign advertising, i.e. t < t( ). However, for any speci…c tari¤ to be e¤ective it needs to be positive and non prohibitive in the goods market.
It can easily be seen, from the top equation of (16) that whenever t < t( ), trade policy does not prohibit trade in the goods market. We then study how this range is a¤ected when protection increases in the services market. It follows that the higher the barrier in the advertising market ( ), the smaller the governments range [0; t( )[ over which the government can choose its tari¤ 'allowing'the foreign …rm to export its own advertising to its export market. When the government chooses a tari¤ t above t( ) trade policy in the goods market 'prohibits' the use of advertising by foreign …rm. Moreover, notice from the previous section and the middle equation of (12) that
is the prohibitive tari¤ above which q = 0. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. For the services market, represented here by the advertising market, to liberalize, the home government needs to commit to a low level of tari¤. Speci…cally, for a given level of , a tari¤ t must satisfy:
Conclusion
In this paper we presented a Hotelling model with vertical di¤erentiation through the use of a non-price instrument (NPI) in order to study the strategic interaction between pricing and a NPI in the presence of trade restrictions. Trade restrictions can directly a¤ect all strategic variables; a tari¤ on the goods market puts the foreign …rm at a pricing disadvantage; a tari¤ on a service such as advertising increases the cost of using this service for the foreign …rm and R&D subsidies to domestic …rms decrease the cost of producing R&D, an NPI, for the home …rm.
This model is a …rst attempt to focus on how such trade policy barriers alters price and non-price competition on the goods market. The main results of our paper are as follows: …rst, no matter whether the trade restriction (tari¤) is placed on the NPI or on the good itself, the foreign (home) …rm prefers to increase (decrease) its use of its pricing tool and give up some of (increase) its use of the NPI. Second, in the presence of the NPI, tari¤s do not always lead both …rms to increase their price:
it can lead the foreign …rm to decrease its price including the tari¤. Although our basic model is rather simple, we believe it can serve as a benchmark which can be easily adapted to other environments. 
The pro…t maximization programs are given by by (6) . The focus here is only on the stability condition and not the optimal advertising levels. These will be derived in appendixes B and C. By computing the second order derivatives and cross derivatives, we obtain the following result:
This inequality is satis…ed if and only if a > . (8) to (11) The …rst stage maximization programs of the home and foreign …rm are the following:
B: Proof of Equations
The FOCs lead to @ @I = 3 + (1 9a)I I + t 9 = 0;
Solving the above system of equations for all values of a > 2=9 leads to the following optimal NPI levels
From (B.1), note that I > 0 , t < 9a 2 3a
and I = 0 , t > 9a 2 3a
. We consider the two cases separately.
. Having determined the optimal NPI level in the …rst stage, the subgame perfect prices and quantities can be determined. The net NPI levels:
Substituting (B.2) in the second stage pricing equilibrium given by (3), we obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prices given by . Thus, the prohibitive tari¤ above which the foreign …rm ceases to produce is denoted by t = (9a 2)=3a.
. For t > t (9a 2)=3a, from (B.1) and (B.4) it can be seen that I = 0 and q = 0. The optimal NPI level of the home …rm can be determined by using its …rst order condition:
where I = 0 and t = t. Solving for I leads to:
The net NPI levels are hence
Finally, replacing (B.6) in equation (3) and (4), we obtain the following equilibrium prices and quantities:
Note that the foreign price p > 0 for all a > 2=9. Finally, putting equations (B.1)
to (B.7) together we obtain the equilibrium NPI levels, net NPI levels, prices and outputs given by equations (8) to (11) .
Remark: Note that for equation (8) to (11) to be an equilibrium, no deviations from the set of strategies (I; I ) should be possible. A deviation, is a strategy in which one …rm invests enough in advertising to throw its opponent out of the market.
Checking for such strategies reveals that the …rms have no incentive to preempt the market when a > . Like before, t is the prohibitive tari¤ in the goods market (c.f. case 3). The level is the prohibitive level of above which the foreign …rm does not advertise when t = 0. Indeed, the level is derived from equation (C.1), when t = 0, then I when = .
The rest of the proof is structured as follows. Case 1 considers the case where t < t( ) where I > 0 and q > 0. Case 2 deals with the case where t( ) 6 t < t in which I = 0 and t is non prohibitive so that q > 0. Case 3. considers t > t where both I and q are equal to zero. . It is easy to see that here q > 0 because t( ) <
for all a > 2=9. By replacing (C.6) in equation (3) and (4) Observe from (C.8) that q > 0 , t < t. where t = t and I = 0. Solving for I leads to:
The net advertising level are therefore given by = = 2 3a : (C.10)
Finally, replacing (C.10) in equation (3) and (4), we obtain the equilibrium prices and quantities given by .
